When a shutdown isn't really a shutdown
Polls are exaggerating the impact of the impasse, which doesn't change our political fundamentals.
The term “government shutdown” is either a misnomer or hyperbole: As long as mail is delivered, Social Security checks are sent out, and the military and air-traffic controllers are still on duty, the government has not shut down. A more accurate term might be “Temporary Suspension of Some Normal Governmental Functions” (TSSNGF for short). Unquestionably, some people have been hurt by the TSSNGF, and many more will likely be affected soon. However, few are likely to have congressional floor privileges nor be employed in the 20510 or 20515 ZIP codes.
Most Americans, and certainly those who have any say in all of this, are insulated from most effects of a TSSNGF. Polls are likely exaggerating the impact. The election is still 56 weeks (or 393 days, if you are really counting) away, and scores, if not hundreds, of things will happen between now and then that can affect public opinion. But more importantly, Democrats or independents who lean Democratic will continue to blame President Trump and congressional Republicans for this; Republicans and GOP-leaning independents will blame Democrats for it.
The tiny little 4 to 6 percent in the middle—many of whom watch, listen, and read little news—will be less aware of it, or have such a low opinion of elected officials that they won’t be surprised by any of it. They also vote less often than partisans.
The insulation of political figures can hardly be overstated; very few voters reside in competitive states and districts where key midterm elections are held, and even fewer of those are swing voters, people with any real doubt about how they will vote, assuming they do vote. That is what happens in a polarized country. Red states and districts elect Republicans, while blue states and districts elect Democrats, leaving very few states and districts with any meaningful contests. One way to think about it is that in blue states and districts, Democrats can usually win with few, if any, pure independents or swing voters; they get over the top with their base vote in these places. Same thing on the Republican side in red states and districts.
In the 24 states that are categorized as red, GOP Senate candidates have won 61 out of 64 of those races (95 percent) in the last four cycles. The three exceptions all came in 2018, when Democratic Sens. Sherrod Brown of Ohio, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, and Jon Tester of Montana were all reelected. Brown and Tester subsequently lost in 2024; Manchin opted not to run again. It couldn’t last, and indeed it didn’t: All three seats flipped red in 2024. Zero Democrats now occupy Senate seats in the 24 red states.
In the 19 solidly blue states during that same period, Democrats won 53 of the 54 Senate races (98 percent), the lone exception being Sen. Susan Collins of Maine winning in 2020. She will get a chance to replicate that political-gravity-defying maneuver next year.
That leaves only Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin as states with any meaningful chance of flipping one way or the other. As this column has noted before, Democrats have won 17 of the 21 Senate races (81 percent) since President Trump first took office, possibly a function of swing voters projecting their animosity towards Trump onto GOP candidates—after all, the Republican Party’s identity has now become absorbed by Trump’s. Or could it be that there is a turnout differential among swing voters in key states, again, perhaps due to Trump? While Trump has a near god-like hold on his fellow Republicans, that does not extend to independents or, certainly, Democrats. The just-released New York Times-Siena poll showed only 35 percent of independents nationally approved of Trump’s handling of the job, while 61 percent disapproved.
Given the deplorable mid-decade redistricting in some states, it is impossible to know what the exact number of swing districts will be at this time next year—though 40 or 50 would probably be a reasonable estimate. The day when personal brands of political figures mattered enough for them to be able to withstand a bad year for their party in anything other than a same-hued state or district is largely over.
This rigidity in Senate and congressional voting patterns now extends to gubernatorial races, which have also become nationalized. Democrats have won 34 out of 44 gubernatorial races (77 percent) in those 19 blue states since 2017; Republicans have won 41 out of 46 red-state governorships (89 percent). Several things are worth noting: Eight of the 44 blue-state races were in New Hampshire and Vermont, both of which have two-year terms; all eight were won by Republican candidates named Chris Sununu, Kelly Ayotte, or Phil Scott. Glenn Youngkin’s victory in Virginia and the Democrats’ near loss in the New Jersey governor’s race four years ago were significantly influenced by President Biden’s declining numbers over the preceding five months. Democrats have won 10 of the 14 purple-state governorships (71 percent) since 2017.
Nobody wins these shutdowns, or TSSNGFs. Occasionally one side loses ground in one, but generally not this far away from an election. In this case Democrats have to stick with it, because so many progressives are convinced the party hasn’t been tough enough in dealing with Trump. The president sees this as an opportunity to wreak more havoc and dismantle even more elements of the federal government he doesn’t like. And congressional Republicans don’t have much say in any of it; they just go along with what Trump wants